Professors Lamparello and MacLean believe that this case presents the court with an opportunity to clarify Atkins v. Virginia and provide additional guidance to the states regarding the processes for determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled.
Based on their experience as practitioners and scholars, Professors Lamparello and MacLean believe that Fla. Stat. § 921.137(1), which the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted as barring evidence of adaptive disability for defendants with an IQ of 70 or above, is inconsistent with Atkins.
As discussed in the attached brief, Atkins identified three areas of cognitive functioning that are relevant to a determination of intellectual disability: subaverage intellectual functioning, evidence of adaptive disability, and onset prior to the age of eighteen. Professors Lamparello and MacLean believe that this three-pronged definition appropriately reflects the fact that intellectual disability is not adequately captured by an IQ score alone. Thus, interpreting Section 921.137(1) to include an "IQ cutoff," is contrary to both Atkins and the individualized consideration that this Court's death penalty jurisprudence demands. There is, of course, a place for bright-line rules. In the death penalty context, categorical rules such as an IQ cutoff can withstand constitutional scrutiny if they protect individuals who should not be executed, even if such a rule would encompass defendants who otherwise could have been executed.
An over-inclusive rule, however imprecise, still protects those that it was intended to protect. It errs on the side of caution.
To the contrary, a bright-line rule that protects defendants who should not be executed, but allows other defendants-who may be similarly or, worse, more impaired than those in the protected class-to be executed, does the opposite. In this situation, the bright-line rule protects only a portion of the class to which Atkins spoke. Given the considerations expressed in Atkins, erring on the side of caution is the proper way to realize individualized consideration.
In this regard, the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 921.137 (1) Atkins did not, however, thrust the states into uncertain terrain. The majority's opinion adopted clinical definitions of mental retardation that "require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18." 536 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added). In so doing, the majority construed intellectual disability broadly:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.
Id. (emphasis added).
As the Court's discussion reveals, reduced culpability was the sine qua non of its proportionality analysis, and the driving force underlying its adoption of a categorical rule prohibiting execution of This case is no different-except that the number is based on an IQ score, not a birth certificate. The critical distinction is that Roper's bright-line rule served a protective, even if potentially over-inclusive, function. In Hall, the IQ cutoff will most certainly increase the likelihood that a mentally disabled defendant will be executed. This strikes at the heart of what Atkins sought to protect.
Of course, while adults and juveniles are fundamentally different, 14 there is a small but legally significant overlap between juveniles and intellectually disabled adults that IQ cannot capture.
For example, in adults, brain impairments such as frontal lobe disorder, which cause impulse control problems, are similar to the impetuousness that results from juveniles having "less experience with 14 In Roper, the Court explained that "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits are more transitory, less fixed." 543 U.S. at 569.
control over their environment." Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Thus, assuming, arguendo, that a defendant possesses these and possibly other cognitive deficits, they should be included in the intellectual disability calculus. They should not depend on whether a defendant scored a 69, 71, or 75 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Just as a juvenile's individual "background and mental and emotional development" must be considered to assess culpability, the defendant who claims intellectual disability is likewise entitled to present evidence beyond a strict IQ score. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) ). Section 921.137(1) permits such consideration-but only sometimes, and that is the problem. Like juveniles, adults with adaptive or developmental disabilities can-and often are-"less deserving of the most severe punishments." Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (basing its finding of diminished culpability on psychology and developments in brain science). Under Florida's scheme, those who are "less deserving" may-and likely will-be executed. As the dissent below noted, "the current interpretation of the statutory scheme will lead to the execution of a retarded man." 15 Section 921.137 (1) concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("the [Florida Supreme] Court was constrained by the language of the statute and found that an IQ higher than 70 failed to meet the first prong of section 921.137(1), and that no further inquiry was necessary").
3. Hall's Case Underscores the Problems with IQ Cut-Offs.
Professors Lamparello and MacLean express no opinion as to how a court would-or should-rule if Hall's entire background were considered regardless of his IQ-which has fluctuated below and above the statutory threshold. standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community." Based upon the evidence, however, it appears that, had the Florida Supreme Court-or Section 921.137(1)-authorized a more individualized inquiry, it would have been faced with a mountain of evidence that Hall suffered from organic brain damage, emotional disturbances, physical abuse, mental illness, torture as a child, and learning disabilities; if the Hall opinion were affirmed, none of this evidence could even be considered. Id. at 718-19.
Arguably, therefore, Hall's background reveals disabilities in "reasoning, judgment, and control of…impulses," which Atkins held to be indicative of those who "do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct." Id. at 719 (Perry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306). This is precisely why the dissent criticized the Florida Supreme Court's "dogged adherence to a bright-line cutoff of a 70 on an IQ test" as leading to an "absurd result." Id. at 720. That approach establishes a "threshold for the courts to even consider retardation," which in this case prohibited Hall from "attempting to demonstrate concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning to establish retardation." Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation renders Atkins more illusory than real. As the dissent noted, "[i]f the bar against executing the mentally retarded is to mean anything, Freddie Lee Hall cannot be executed." Id. at 718. 19 
Professors
Lamparello and MacLean respectfully submit that "evolving standards of decency as evidenced by a maturing society" require courts to correct injustices as new information arises. In the context of intellectual disability, it has.
19 That the defendant may nonetheless use evidence of intellectual disability in mitigation does not render the Florida courts' interpretation of Section 921.137(1) constitutional. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 ("reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury").
